I go into Fogo, open Sessions, create a new session, set a spending cap, lock the list of allowed actions, and attach an expiration time before signing. After that, I’m reminded of a familiar crypto paradox: what people call “convenient” often comes with broad permissions, and broad permissions tend to fail because of one small bug, or because a centralized link gets hit at the worst possible moment.
Looking at Fogo from a mechanism perspective, it seems they’re choosing to reduce risk before optimizing for revenue, at least on paper. At the consensus layer, the epoch based validator zones model, stake filtering, and a minimum stake threshold are design choices meant to limit how deeply an underpowered or misaligned zone can participate in proposing and voting. It doesn’t make things more exciting, but it can narrow the attack surface.
At the product layer, Sessions let users delegate by scope, spending limit, and time window, meaning risk is partitioned instead of concentrated in a single signature.
But I still keep my skepticism: the audit notes that if a centralized paymaster is compromised, funds within the delegated scope can still be at risk, and DoS issues tied to transient wSOL account creation need to be handled seriously, not just acknowledged.
In the end, I don’t buy profit promises anymore. I just watch which projects are willing to impose limits and pay the cost of safety, then wait to see whether that discipline holds when real growth pressure arrives, and $FOGO will be tested precisely there.