U.S. Strategic Pivot: From Global to Hemispheric Focus in the Great Power Competition

In a significant recalibration of American strategy, the 2026 National Defense Strategy has repositioned securing the U.S. homeland and Western Hemisphere as the Pentagon's top priority, while designating China as the primary global competitor to be deterred "through strength, not confrontation". This reordering marks a profound shift from the previous administration's focus, signaling a new chapter in U.S. foreign policy that prioritizes influence closer to home while maintaining a global stance against Beijing's ambitions.

A Strategic Reordering: The 2026 Defense Doctrine

The explicit reprioritization within U.S. strategic documents is unambiguous. The defense strategy declares an end to ceding key terrain in the Americas and commits to upholding the Monroe Doctrine, a 19th-century policy asserting U.S. primacy in the hemisphere. This inward and regional focus is accompanied by a clear directive for increased burden-sharing from allies in both Europe and the Americas, framing them as partners who must contribute more to their own defense.

The repositioning of China from the "most significant strategic competitor" to the second priority reflects a nuanced, though still central, role in U.S. planning. The strategy insists the U.S. does not seek to "strangle or humiliate" China but aims to deter it through credible military strength. Concurrently, challenges like the war in Ukraine are framed as manageable threats to NATO's eastern flank, with Russia receiving notably less emphasis than in prior strategies.

Strategic Timeline: The Evolution of U.S.-China Posture

· 2022

The National Defense Strategy formally identifies China as the "most significant strategic competitor."

· 2024

Analysis of economic policies (2017-2024) shows limited success in changing China's trade practices but stronger outcomes in protecting U.S. tech.

· 2025

Trump administration reorients foreign policy, aiming to reestablish U.S. preeminence in the Western Hemisphere.

· 2026

New National Defense Strategy is published, elevating Homeland & Western Hemisphere defense to top priority; China becomes priority #2.

The Dual Arena: Global Tech Rivalry and Hemispheric Influence

This strategic pivot creates a dual arena of competition. Globally, the U.S. and China remain locked in a struggle for technological dominance, described as a clash between two "predatory superpowers". Both nations are pouring vast resources into achieving supremacy in areas like quantum computing and advanced semiconductors, often at significant domestic cost and with disruptive global spillover effects.

Simultaneously, the battleground intensifies in America's backyard. The U.S. is now explicitly focused on guaranteeing military and commercial access to strategic points from the Arctic to South America, including the Panama Canal and the Gulf of America. This comes as China deepens its economic and diplomatic ties across Latin America and the Caribbean, a region of growing concern highlighted by ongoing U.S. government research into Beijing's activities there.

Economic Statecraft and Narrative Warfare

The competition extends deeply into the economic realm. The U.S. has employed tariffs, export controls, and subsidies in a mixed-effort to defend its interests. A 2024 RAND Corporation assessment found these policies successful in controlling key technology transfers and reducing some import dependencies, but largely unsuccessful in persuading China to abandon unfair trade practices.

China, characterized as a "dependency superpower," leverages its economic scale through massive exports, control of critical supply chains, and strategic foreign investment to make partners economically reliant. Its "dual circulation" policy aims to reduce China's own external dependencies while developing "new quality productive forces" in high-tech sectors.

A subtler, more insidious form of conflict has also emerged: narrative weaponization. Analysts note that China has adeptly exploited the uncertainty and transactionalism of the current U.S. administration's foreign policy. By selectively amplifying Washington's own abrasive rhetoric toward allies and its apparent willingness to negotiate, Beijing positions itself as a more predictable and pragmatic partner, particularly to European capitals uneasy about U.S. commitments.

China’s Calculated Response: Exploiting Strategic Anxiety

China’s strategy in response to the U.S. pivot is not direct confrontation but strategic exploitation of perceived weaknesses. Its goal is to decouple its rivals' allies from Washington by sowing doubt about American reliability and long-term commitment.

In Europe, this involves a seduction strategy, presenting China as a stable economic alternative at a time when the U.S. is perceived as hostile to the EU and willing to use economic coercion against friends. This narrative fuels existing European debates about "strategic autonomy" and complicates efforts to maintain a unified, security-focused approach to China.

In Taiwan, the approach is more coercive, targeting public confidence in U.S. defense guarantees. Chinese strategy amplifies every signal of U.S. transactionalism or volatility to foster abandonment anxieties, aiming to convince Taiwanese society that alignment with Washington is unsustainable.

In the Western Hemisphere, China’s growing influence through trade, investment, and infrastructure projects presents a direct challenge to the revitalized Monroe Doctrine, testing the U.S. commitment to its newly declared top priority.

Implications for a Fracturing Global Order

The U.S. strategic reorientation and China's adaptive responses are accelerating the fragmentation of the post-Cold War international system. The era of a single "indispensable nation" underwriting a rules-based order is fading, replaced by a landscape where great power competition is both global and local.

For middle powers and regional actors, this creates both pressure and opportunity. The European Union, caught between two "rapacious superpowers," is urged by its own analysts to chart a third path: boosting its own consumption, retaining capital within the bloc, and rallying other nations to support a rules-based multipolar world. Similarly, nations in Latin America may find themselves with more bargaining power as both Washington and Beijing vie for their allegiance.

The fundamental challenge for U.S. strategy is whether it can successfully manage a two-front competition—consolidating influence in its own hemisphere while simultaneously conducting a global, long-term technological and ideological rivalry with China. The success of this rebalancing will depend not only on military posture but on consistent diplomacy, reliable partnership, and the ability to offer a compelling alternative to China's model of development and dependency. In this new era, power is measured not just by reach, but by the resilience of influence at home and abroad.